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Environmental Regulations and Consumers: Case of the Recreationist

David Scrogin
Department of Economics
University of Central Florida
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
(407) 823-4129 voice
(407) 823-3269 fax
dscrogin@bus.ucf.edu

Kevin Boyle
Department of Resource Economics and Policy
University of Maine
Orono, ME 04473-5782

George Parsons
Department of Marine Policy
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716

Andrew Plantinga
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Oregon State University
Corvallis, OR 97331-3601

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Abstract

Imposition of regulations on use of the environment is resulting increasingly due to public pressures. With recreation on public lands and waterways, regulations may influence expectations of quality, destination choice and welfare. This paper examines the effects of regulations in the case of recreational fisheries. The empirical application develops a joint model of expected catch and expected harvest in conjunction with a random utility model of regulated site choice. Findings for Maine fisheries indicate that regulations have sizable effects on catch and harvest, probability of site choice and consumer surplus.