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1. Introduction
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The
basis for a philosophy of technology has always been hampered by a
tendency to use the most 'advanced' machine of the day as a paradigm
for human cognition As Bødker (1997) points out, it was once the steam
engine but in the last few decades the computer has provided an example
of a machine which is seemingly able to perform mental tasks in
contrast to the preceding 'all-manual' machines. It has even given rise
to a branch of psychology known as cognitive science. This concept of
the machine as a model for human cognition is a rather curious reversal
of the true role of any machine, that of as an assistant or mediator of
daily activities. There is no reason to regard the computer as anything
more than a machine developed from a long line of tools used to assist
human activity.
Background
The
explosive growth in the use of information technology is having a
profound effect on the work practices of humans. In order to increase
the benefits of information technology computer systems and their
interfaces must be designed as tools which are compatible with the
capabilities of their human users. Much research has been aimed at
providing technicians and programmers with a proper picture of the
user, most specifying the psychological features which should be taken
into account when developing an interface. However, there is still no
agreement on the optimal psychological approach to this complicated
area. Up to recent times Western cognitive psychology has been the main influence in the development of information technology interfaces but
attempts to apply it to human computer interaction have had limited
success due to the narrow focus of this discipline. It has concerned
itself more with the cognitive process and projected this into a
philosophy of human-computer interaction which is based on the computer
analogy of input-processing-output to describe the functioning of the
human mind. The reason for this is the apparent unanimity between this
branch of psychology and the architecture of the computer both in
concept and vocabulary. There is a readily identifiable compatibility
between human and computer "components" when computer devices such as
the keyboard, memory and VDU are compared to disembodied human devices
such as the eyes, brain and fingers. This tempting analogy has led to a
concept of human-computer interaction (HCI) which treats the computer
and its human operator as equals. The logical extension of this line of
reasoning is that ultimately it would be possible to build a computer
with the ability to outstrip the human mind. This has given rise to
fields dedicated to the 'cybernaut' quest such as the study of
artificial intelligence and knowledge based systems. They have mostly
had limited success although recently the perception of their ability
has been exaggerated by the development of a machine capable of
humiliating the world chess grandmaster. Philosophically the dream of
the technophile was realised in this chess contest, the role of the
machine having been reversed from that of a tool for enhancing life to
that of a machine which seeks to dominate it. The practical outcome of
this general approach is that any experiment to examine the
compatibility of a computer with a human is restricted to an
interaction between these two components alone to the exclusion of the
context of the real life interaction of the human work activity. This
can be seen in the classic HCI experimental model shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. HCI Experimental Model
Is There An Alternative Model?
This
general cognitive approach has led HCI experimenters to a frustrating
lack of design tools suitable for predicting human reaction to
information technology. It is essential to explore the processes where
information technology intercedes in the work practices of humans. A
branch of psychology developed by Lev Vygotsky in the beginning of this
century provides a different philosophical approach and opens new
perspectives for constructing experimental research into this problem.
Vygotskian psychology and activity theory take a much broader view of
human psyche as being the product of cultural and social forces
(Vygotsky, 1978). From its perspective people are not a collection of
cognitive processes but in a complex interaction with the world
directed to the process of living.
In
this approach the main feature of the psyche is the active position of
human beings toward the world in which they live. This world and its
social context is referred to as 'objective reality' and consists of
all the things (objects) which contribute to human existence such as
events, happenings, interactions, etc. Humans are continually changing
the objects and creating artefacts - tools. This complex interaction of
individuals with their surrounding has been called activity and
regarded as the fundamental unit of analysis of human psyche
(A.Leontiev, 1978, C.Tolman, 1988). Activity is motivated by the
objects to be changed. Object orientedness and mediation by tools is
one of the most distinguishing characteristics of activity. Tools are
seen as having extended human ability to achieve the goals of an
activity, that is, to change objects in the world. This theory treats
tools as a means of satisfying real needs and achieving corresponding
goals. This leads us to a different experimental scheme, one with many
more elements which emphasise the role of the computer as a tool
embedded in human activity, both mental and physical.
Figure 2 Activity Theory Framework
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2. Cognitive Psychology As A Philosophical Basis For Technology
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Recent
trends in HCI research heavily favour exploration of the cognitive
processes, due to what is seen as the qualitative new form of artefact
embedded in the use of the computer - the automation of brain work
compared to the automation of hand-work. Many of the problems
associated with the information processing model of cognitive science,
evident in such areas as expert systems and artificial intelligence,
can be seen to be related to the incompleteness and narrow base of this
cognitive approach. Computerised automation, where the operational
aspects of human mental work are removed from the 'human sphere' and
transferred to technology, are part of, and not significantly different
to, the transference of human physical work to technology which has
been going on for thousands of years. When operations are carried out
by technology, it still realises the wishes of the subject, and hence
involves the human psyche.
The
first real possibility of building a nervous system computationally
equivalent to the human mind was elevated from the realms of science
fiction by the construction of electronic computers in the late 1940's.
The view of a computer as a 'thinking' machine was based on Turing's
concept of thinking as an algorithmic process with the compelling
analogy between human and machine of input, processing and output. This
view, held by many artificial intelligence theorists who see computers
as substitute humans with identical capabilities is, however, fraught
with problems. As Karpatschof (1992) explains: 'It is meaningless to
expect a full correspondence between a human and a machine. Not only is
a machine lacking in the most important human characteristics, the
machine has also many attributes we don't find in a human being. That
is actually the reason for making it in the first place.' Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1986) also share similar beliefs when they say that :
'computers as reasoning machines can't match human intuition and
expertise, so in determining what computers should do we have to
contrast their capacities with the more generous gifts possessed by the
human mind.' In spite of comments like these, a great deal of effort
has been put into the field of artificial intelligence over the last
decades without , it seems, ever turning to the various branches of
psychology as a source model for ' human intelligence', the very thing
they were purporting to duplicate artificially.
Cognitive Science
Cognitive
science emerged in the mid 1970s out of a realisation that a
multi-disciplinary approach was required if we were to understand
higher mental processes and structures. It attempts to bring together
what is known about the mind from many academic disciplines:
psychology, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, and computer
science. The assumption is that all important human insight can be
reduced to principles and rules - that machines can think (McCorduck,
1979). Cognitive science asks about thought and thinking, about
consciousness and computation.
In
line with cognitive science the concept of cognitive psychology emerged
in the USA and UK as an outcome of computer technologies by assuming
that the computer can provide a new paradigm for psychology. Cognitive
psychology therefore, analyses human mental processes with the aim of
understanding human behaviour. Information theories of perception,
attention, memory, emotions and personality are developed. Humans are
viewed as an 'active process of information eternally striving to sum
up and interpret the incoming data and to interpret and reproduce the
information stored in its memory through a variety of algorithms and
strategies' (Tikhomirov, 1988). In this trend psychology at large was
declared a science of information processing. Although artificial
intelligence, cognitive science and cognitive psychology have different
aims and methods of investigation, they basically all share an
understanding of human thinking as information processing. In addition
they interpret cognition or intelligence as the most important
constituent property of the psychic processes. When using the concept
of cognitive approaches in the following we do not distinguish between
the three of them.
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial
Intelligence (AI) aims at creating computer software and hardware that
imitates the human mind or functions of the human brain. The role of
the computer is to replace the human in intellectual spheres, such as
mathematical calculations, manipulation of numbers and letters,
decision-making, problem-solving, and so on. According to Feigenbaum
(1977) some work towards the construction of intelligent artefacts such
as expert systems, which purport to be models of experts' problem
solving and expert knowledge automatised in information programs.
Others view artificial intelligence as 'theoretical psychology' seeking
information processing models of human thoughts leading us to a view of
AI as the study of 'cognitive' phenomena within the machine.
Two
related points of critiques have emerged. One argument is in opposition
to the very rational conception of human beings embedded in the
cognitive approaches emerged from a meta-theoretical point of view
(e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). Also some empirical studies suggest
that the design process is characterised by intuition and imagination
as the driving force of the process, rather than a rational
problem-solving strategy (Aboulafia et al, 1993). In most cases the
designers relied upon their intuitive understanding of the system,
gained from previous experience. Another design study showed similar
results. Bansler and Boedker (1993) found a gap between the way systems
development is represented in structured analysis by Yourdon and
DeMarco and the way in which it was carried out. Designers did not
follow the design procedures prescribed but, in general, had a very
pragmatic attitude towards using it.
As
well as arguing against the limited understanding of problem-solving as
being a rational rule-based process of thinking, the studies indicate
that the way methods are used is related to the context of application.
A general view by the designers in one of the studies were that a main
hindrance in modelling techniques was that these techniques didn't take
into account social aspects, such as team work and organisational
issues (Aboulafia et al 1993). They suggested that 'a bag of tools'
from which they could pick and choose, would be useful, so they could
adapt different methods to their own purposes and integrate these into
their own design processes.
Another
criticism is related to the attempt to use the same concepts and
methods as properties of both systems and human beings. Bansler and
Boedker's (1993) study found a possible limitation of modelling methods
'inherent' in the methods themselves. The basic idea of structured
analysis is to model organisations and work processes as information
processing systems with the aim of producing detailed functional
descriptions of tasks and operations. There is no distinction made
between the way people act and the way machines function. Consequently,
the method has a number of 'defects' such as reducing problem solving
and judgement to mere rule following, ignoring informal communication,
underestimating of errors, giving no help to analysing work
organisation, etc. And as Bansler and Boedker (1993) stress, while is
makes sense to understand a computer system in terms of data processes,
it is doubtful whether it makes much sense to understand work in these
same terms.
It
is becoming more obvious to even die-hard AI proponents that the
information processing units in humans and computers are indeed
different. Much criticism therefore, has emerged of this cognitive
science understanding of human cognition, and a question is if it
possible to overcome the problem within the framework of cognitive
science.
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3. Limitations of the Cognitive Science Approach
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Winograd
and Flores (1986) argue that 'contrary to widespread current belief -
one cannot construct machines that either exhibit or successfully model
intelligent behaviour'. They go on to say that 'the essence of
intelligence is to act appropriately when there is no simple
pre-definition of the problem or the space of states in which to search
for a solution. Rational search within a problem space is not possible
until the space itself had been created, and is useful only to the
extent that the formal structure corresponds effectively to the
situation.' Their analysis is formulated on the philosophy of Heidegger
which proposes as a basis for understanding cognition should be built
around our 'being-in-the-world' which challenges the dominant view of
cognition based on the systematic manipulation of representations.
Brooks
(1991) states that 'out of the soup of ideas on how to build
intelligent machines the disembodied and non-situated approach of
problem-solving search systems emerged as dominant, at least within the
AI community'. Search was extended to make use of heuristics to prune
the search space and before long the focus became the control of
search. No doubt the popularity of search was due to the ease with
which its basic tree structure can be programmed on a digital computer
but it is this opportunism that has taken it further away from the very
thing that it set out to imitate by amplifying the abstraction away
from connectedness to the world. He criticises the branch of AI known
as Knowledge Engineering for concentrating much of its energies on
anomalies within formal systems which are never used for any practical
task. He goes on to say that there is an implicit assumption that
someday the inputs and outputs will be connected to something that will
make use of them. The heuristic approach to problem solving is examined
by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) who found that only beginners use this
approach. As people become more proficient in their field to the level
of expert they intuitively move away from using abstract rules to being
able to recognise thousands of special cases. Brookes (1991) also
criticises the view of knowledge as being stored in a way that is
independent of the circumstances in which it was acquired. In comparing
human and artificial thought he says:
'Biological
systems run on massively parallel, low speed computation, within an
essentially fixed topology network with bounded depth. Almost all
Artificial Intelligence research, and indeed almost all modern
computation, runs on essentially Von Neumann architecture, with a
large, inactive memory which can respond at very high speed over an
extremely narrow channel, to a very high speed central processing unit
which contains very little state. When connections to sensors and
actuators are also considered the gap between biological systems and
our artificial systems widens.'
These
sentiments are echoed by Suchman (1987) when she says that 'the
question of theoretical versus practical criteria of adequacy for
machine intelligence is rendered moot by the problems involves in
constructing a device that even appears to behave in ways that are
purposeful or intelligent'. Dreyfus (1992) points out that the belief
that both human beings and computers are information processing units
presupposes that the mechanisms underlying them are essentially the
same. Computers, he says deal with facts but humans are the source of
facts, in a world of facts created by them in the process of living. He
goes on to say: 'This human world with its recognisable objects is
organised by human beings using their embodied capacities to satisfy
their embodied needs. There is no reason to suppose that a world
organised in terms of these fundamental human capacities should be
accessible by any other means.' This concept of embodiment or
situatedness has been addressed by cognitivists as a possible solution
to the AI problem. Given this criticism and concern about the use of
cognitive science as a philosophical basis for information technology
the next section looks at an alternative approach.
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4. Vygotskian Psychology and Activity Theory
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Introduction
Activity theory is a psychological
theory that had its beginnings in the German philosophy of Kant and
Hegel and was later developed by the Russian psychologists L.S.
Vygotsky, A.N. Leontiev and others during the first half of this
century. It is a theory which treats the individual as an outgrowth of
social forces rather than the autonomous being.
There is evidence of the influence of a
great many other philosophers such as Janet, Wallon, Piaget,
Wertheimer, Tolman with his neobehaviourism and particularly John Dewey
with his work on pragmatism. Others include James with his work on
substantialism and Spinoza, a favourite of Vygotsky, with his belief
that mental and neuropsychological phenomena were two attributes of the
one substance. Although Vygotsky and his followers were accustomed to
citing Marx frequently, it is difficult to judge whether his ideas had
much influence on the development of the theory, due to the fact that
it was generally accepted at the time that Marxist-Leninist philosophy
had to be used as the basis for all branches of scientific study
irrespective of whether it had any relevance to the topic being
studied. The theory has become familiar to western psychologists
through the work of Cole and Maltzman, 1969, Wertsch, 1981, 1994,
Raeithel, 1990, Kuutti, 1990, 1992, Engestrom, 1990, Kaptellinin, 1992,
1994 and Zinchenko, 1992.
Overview
Vygostkian psychology (Vygotsky, 1978,
1981) stated that human mind is constructed through a subject's
interactions with the world and is an attribute of the relationship
between subject and object. Consciousness is neither reducible to
behaviour nor separate from it, but instead is an attribute of the
organisation of practical activity. It is the process that organises
behaviour. Vygotsky also claimed that consciousness is not an attribute
of any particular state or process, but is an attribute of the way in
which states and processes such as attention and memory, are organised
and functionally related both to behaviour and to each other. It was
consciousness that established the connection between the various
processes, it both creates them and transforms them. In particular the
nature of a goal-directed activity transforms its user. He thus
introduced the idea of externally mediated activity, actions that
involve the use of external means to reach a goal. This led to the idea
that mental processes could only be understood if we understand the
tools and signs that mediate them.
Tool Mediation
A basic tenet of Vygotsky's theory was
that tools occupy a mediating role, they mediate human reaction with
the world. Tools therefore are social objects with certain modes of
operation developed socially in the course of labour and are only
possible because they correspond to the objectives of a practical
action. Tools can be either external (physical, technical) such as
artefacts, instruments and machines or internal (psychological) such as
laws, signs, procedures, methods and language. Physical tools are
designed to manipulate physical objects (e.g. hammer) while
psychological tools are used by humans to influence other people or
themselves (e.g. concepts, advertisements, calenders). Since
psychological tools are included in the process of behaviour they alter
the entire flow and structure of mental functions. Similarly the
physical tool (including computers) alters the process of natural
adaptation by determining the form of labour operations. A physical
tool can be seen as an instrument of labour, a thing which is
interposed between a person and the object of their labour and which
'serves as the conductor' of their activity. Although tools expand our
possibilities to manipulate and transform different objects they also
have a limiting effect in that the object can only be manipulated
within the limitation of the tool.
His basic idea was of historically
evolving object-oriented practical activity carried out by humans
determining the genesis, structure and contents of the human mind.
Vygotsky derived his original ideas from an analysis of the features of
specifically human activity - work activity, productive activity
carried on with tools, activity that is indigenously social i.e.
developed under conditions of cooperation and sharing by people. He had
isolated the two principal interrelated features basic to psychology.
These were the 'instrumented' (tool mediated) structure of human
activity and its incorporation into the system of interrelationships
with other people. This means that the higher mental functions in
humans originate only in the interaction of people with people.
Vygotsky did not make a complete analysis of the specific concept of
activity, but his theoretical approach pre-supposed the concept as one
of its fundamental building blocks. The theoretician who followed up
Vygotsky's work and is most closely associated with the development of
a coherent activity theory framework was A.N.Leontiev.
Activity Theory Structure
Activity, according to Leontiev (1978,
1981) is not a reaction and not a totality of reactions but a system
that has structure, its own internal transitions and transformations,
its own development. Activity brings together in one unit of analysis
both internal, psychological phenomena and an external, objective
world. Leontiev was opposed to the separation of what goes on in our
mind with what goes on around us and sought to examine the profoundly
unique nature of the psychic phenomena that distinguishes it from other
'objective phenomena of reality' (the real world). He sums it up thus:
'...our activity seems to occur as it were on two primordially
different (and) opposite planes:
The initial and fundamental form of
human activity is external, practical activity. The internal plane of
activity, inner mental operations and actions, is formed in the process
of internalisation. Internalisation is the transition in which external
processes with external, material objects are transformed into
processes that take place at the mental level, the level of
consciousness. During this transition these processes undergo special
changes - they become generalised, verbalised, abbreviated; and most
importantly, they become the means for further development that
transcends what is possible with external activity.
Activity here has its general
collective meaning, we need to deal with specific activities, each of
which answers a definite need of the subject, is directed toward an
object of that need, is extinguished as a result of its satisfaction,
and is produced again in other altogether different conditions.
Activity types can differ among themselves depending on the difference
between their objects. The object of an activity Leontiev says is its
true motive, which may be either real or imagined, thus activity does
not exist without motive. He called a process an action if it is
subordinated to the representation of the result that must be attained,
that is if it is subordinated to a conscious purpose. He goes on to say
that just as the concept of activity is related to the concept of
motive then the concept of purpose is related to the concept of action.
Human activity he explains, does not exist except in the form of action
or a chain of actions with one and the same action accomplishing
various activities and may be transferred from one activity to another.
This means that activity is usually accomplished by a certain complex
of actions subordinated to particular goals that may be isolated from
the general goal. In other words, these actions are seen as
goal-directed processes but, in society, these processes are rarely
related directly to the goal where even the simplest division of labour
leads to 'goal-isolation'. The needs of a person working on an assembly
line are not satisfied by the immediate results of producing something,
but by a share of the results of the collective activity in the form of
salary. The actions that realise activity are aroused by its motive but
directed towards a goal. The means of accomplishing actions Leontiev
called operations. Just as activity is related to goals, operations he
saw as related to conditions. In a case where the goal remains the same
but conditions change then it is only the operational content of the
action that changes. Actions and operations he saw as the 'units' of
activity.
Thus Leontiev introduced a three level
structure of activity. Associated with each level is a specific type of
unit, the first of which is the unit of activity (detyatel'nost). Here
'activity' means the real activities as opposed to human activity in
general and includes such things as labour, formal education and play.
It is not determined by the physical context in which humans function
but is a socio-cultural creation imposed on the context by the
participants. The next level of analysis is the action (deistvie)
which, although related to an activity at a particular time can vary
independently of it and is transferable to other activities. A
particular action could be executed while a person participates in
different activities such as work, play or education. The third level
of analysis is the operation (operatsiya) and this relates to the
concrete conditions under which the action is carried out and includes
the resources for reaching the goal. The goal, which is embedded in a
specific set of conditions, comprises the task of the activity. This
can be summarised schematically:
| Activity | - | Motive |
| Actions | - | Goals |
| Operations | - | Conditions (Tasks) |
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This structure can however, be
divided in a way which depends on the characteristics of each component
and on their inter-relationships which in turn are mobile and
changeable. In an integrated activity the within-level and
between-level organisations are realised by the integration and
unification of the functionally defined processes.
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5. Human Computer Interaction and Activity Theory
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The diverse nature of the many current cognitive
techniques used in HCI design and evaluation makes the job of
classifying and identifying them as models, methods or architectures
difficult. Over the last fifteen years a large number HCI design tools
and techniques have been proposed. Howes (1994) has identified twenty
three different approaches, each oriented towards a small and
manageable part of the overall issue of the way humans interact with
computers.
The psychological theory
expounded by Vygotsky and extended by followers such as Leontiev and
others has been discovered by the international community of
researchers in human-computer interaction and computer supported
cooperative work over the last ten years. For example see Bannon &
Bødker, 1991; Bødker, 1991; Draper, 1993; Engestrom. 1990; Gould &
Verenikina, 1995; Kaptelinin, 1992; Kuutti, 1992; Nardi, 1992, 1997.
Its generally well-developed frameworks may prove more beneficial than
traditional cognitive psychology in the analysis of the reaction
between humans and machines.
Kaptelinin
(1992) has identified four points which are of central importance to
activity theory and the special role that tools in general play within
this framework.
- the identification of the specific psychological functions of computer tools and how they differ from other kinds of artefacts,
- consideration of the psychological nature of
the functionally equivalent processes involved, more specifically
whether they are activities, actions or operations since this can
affect the design and training strategies,
- an analysis of the development of users from novice to expert as they develop new skills and abilities with experience,
- the relationship between computer tools and
cultural influences which can render successful systems in one social
setting ineffective in another
It stresses the
vertical integration of psychological analysis and stresses the
following points usually missed by the cognitive approach:
Activity theory provides a paradigm for the description and understanding of the way humans deal with computers within the context
of the user's environment. Recently, HCI researchers came to
understanding of the importance of the context in which
computer-mediated activities take place mainly due to the work of Lucy
Suchman (1987). However, contextual factors are rather elusive and
difficult to identify (Nardi, 1997, Pennel et al, 1997). It is here
that activity theory helps by providing a theoretical framework for
describing context of human activity through the structural analysis of
the activity, in particular - the highest level of it - motivation.
Definition of the motive as the object of transformation within the
activity brings together psychological factors (drive, motive, meaning
of the activity) and contextual factors (objects as artefacts belonging
to a particular social cultural-historical context). In this
respect the activity theory approach is not a theory which substitutes
for other approaches but it brings a more broader, holistic,
integrative philosophical view of the use of information technology by
humans.
It also should be noted that activity
theory shares a few common ideas with contemporary developed task
analysis, which presents a detailed description of individual actions
and operations. Activity theory is based on a much broader set of
structures dealing with the higher levels of activity and paying
attention to integrative relationships between the actions of the
activity.
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6. Executive Information Systems Individual Interface Design
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Recently activity theory has been
applied to the development of executive information systems interfaces
( Hasan , Gould and Hyland , 1998, Verenikina, Gould, 1997). This is a
particularly promising area for applications since the development of
executive information systems (EIS) present particular problems for the
designer. Not only are the clients for whom the system is being
designed not known, but they are of a disparate group with different
ways of conducting business, making decisions, using data, arriving at
conclusions, etc. For an executive to make use of an information system
to improve management efficiency an interface compatible with
individual management style is essential.
Software developers have been producing
systems for many years which purported to be executive information
systems. Unfortunately very few of these systems have been successful.
The problem cited in the past has always been that the spreadsheet
software on which the systems were usually based was not sufficiently
sophisticated to deal with the problem. This, however, is no longer the
case. Very sophisticated multidimensional databases are now capable of
extracting complex combinations of the most obscure of data and
presenting it in every imaginable way, all at considerable speed. The
problem has changed from one of software engineering to one relating to
the psychology of executive users. It has long been known that
executives manage in their own particular style. It is also well known
that these different styles need different types of information
presented in different ways. The question is how do we go about finding
out the best mesh of information and business management style so that
an EIS is useful to an individual executive.
Existing research which studied
personalities and tried to apply it to interface design were
unsuccessful because of the difficulty in applying psychological
studies of personality to this particular case - they were too far
removed from the problem. One possible approach is based on the study
of a personal profile of an executive. This profile will consist of an
ensemble of the executive's business activities relating to the use of
the EIS as a tool embedded in the activities. This will enable the
information system to function as a tool for performing the activities
and will enable designers to devise ways that an interface can be
designed to extract, amalgamate and present information in a way that
suits the business management style of the executive. Kaptelinin and
Nardi (1997) have recently created an 'Activity Check List' for
analysing the structure of activities. It is a good example of the
operationalisation of activity theory concepts for practical use.
An example of the influence of
identification of different levels of activities is shown in an
information retrieval system design (Hyland, 1998). Activity Theory is
used to present a more integrated view of the process of information
retrieval and suggest how these problems and their solutions fit
together. Hyland shows that implicit in much of the information
retrieval research is the assumption that the person is engaged in the activity
of locating data from a visualisation of some set of the data which is
used to navigate and locate that subset which is required. However,
using the specific meaning of 'activity' as applied in activity theory
this assumption is incorrect. In such cases, the search for data would
be an action that is carried out to complete the activity of writing a
report or other broader based undertaking. Hyland goes on to say:
"The actual process of searching, the
keystrokes used and so on, are the operations used and these depend on
the conditions encountered by the user. This distinction between
activity and action is not a trivial one. The supposition that most
users are involved in the activity of locating data has led to many
problems that have been raised in the literature. For users who have a
clearly defined search and are familiar with the system being used, the
main concern is that the system provides an appropriate level of recall
and precision as quickly as possible. For such users it could be
reasonably assumed that much of the search process would be carried out
an operational level. For a user with a poor knowledge of the system,
it cannot be assumed that this is the case. Such a user may shift the
focus of his or her activity to the use of the information retrieval
systems, placing the original activity in abeyance for the time being.
If systems are to be used not at an operational level but as an
activity in its own right, then system developers need to adopt a
different focus in their system design. One example of this would be a
change in the help that the system must provide to such a user."
It is important to distinguish between
the various levels of interaction. Bannon (1991) has highlighted the
case of discretionary users who might use computers to assist with
everyday tasks but who have alternative means of accomplishing them. If
an information retrieval systems is built on the assumption that all
users work at an operational level then discretionary users, for whom
the use of the system is in itself a significant activity, will reject
the system
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7. Conclusions
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Psychology has a long way to go
before it will be readily accepted by technology developers as a basis
for their design. It is possible that part of the problem has been the
incomplete model inherent in cognitive psychology although there is
strong evidence that most developers pay scant regard to any form of
psychology when developing new systems. In Vygotskian activity theory
designers have a model which is more complete and could certainly
provide some benefits to human centred interfaces. A philosophical
basis for the inclusion of technology into our lives must seek to place
human considerations first - a possibility only if sound human
psycholgy is available to technology builders.
|
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