synthesizing the philosophy of technology with the philosophy of information to create A Philosophy of Information Technology
October 10, 2006	Nik R. Hassan University of Minnesota Duluth
ABSTRACT
Based on the history and philosophy of technology and information, this essay weaves a synthesis of the major philosophical views to lay the foundations for a novel philosophy of IT.  The result of this synthesis promises fresh approaches that bridge the gap between the technical world of computers and the subjective and humanistic world of man.  Using the proposed philosophy of IT, the information systems (IS) field can escape its “organizational straitjacket” and restrictive “instrumental” approaches to embrace the potential it holds in shaping and enhancing the human experience. Keywords: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Information, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Information Technology
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION WHY STUDY THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF …? THE ORIGINS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY TIME FOR INFORMATION SYSTEM TO ESCAPE ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRAITJACKET OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY THE PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION IN THE IS FIELD PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY + PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION=PHILOSOPHY OF IT CONCLUSION REFERENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

Dilthey (1833-1911), one of the founders of modern social science, describes philosophy as “the reflective attitude which raises all human activity to consciousness and, indeed, to universally valid knowledge” (Dilthey, 1954, p. 10).  Whenever mankind faces a problem that knowledge or scientific practice is unable to solve, inspiration can be found in philosophy.  Philosophy has historically influenced the development of many specialized fields of knowledge.  At the same time, philosophy itself has been substantially enriched by progress in those specialized fields.  Within the spirit of this philosophical reflection, this essay proposes a direction based on a philosophy of information technology (IT) for the field of information system (IS).  As the field that studies phenomena surrounding IT, the IS field needs to escape the constraints of its “referent disciplines” so that it may be free to theorize about IT and develop the foundations of inquiry into IT-related phenomena.  The paper begins by introducing the philosophy of technology and philosophy of information.  By combining the potential areas of research provided by alternative philosophies of technology with a proposed philosophy of information, the paper argues for novel approaches that support a more progressive view of the IS field.

Studying the philosophy and history of a field of knowledge offers unique insights into uncovering hidden treasures and possibilities for the field's future development.  Most of the sciences owe their establishment to the different philosophies that gave birth to them.  For example, psychology was considered part of philosophy until Descartes's dualistic philosophy of mind and body demonstrated how the human mind could be studied distinct from the body (Descartes, 1988).  Kant extended this philosophy by suggesting that reality (the noumenal world) can only be studied through the help of the phenomenal world, thereby making possible the discourse of how the mind shapes reality.  This insight is one of the many philosophies that made possible the study of psychology.  Although in the beginning, Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1783) discounted the possibility of psychology becoming a natural science (Kant, 1891), he laid the foundations for psychology to become a human science in his later work, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798).  Even so, psychology did not immediately emerge as a discipline.  It took close to 100 years for both Wundt (1874) and James (1890) to set up their first psychology labs, signaling the birth of the discipline of experimental psychology.

Similarly, Heder (1744-1803), using his philosophy of human history and development, began laying the foundations of the disciplines of anthropology and linguistics at the same time Kant was working on his philosophy (Zammito, 2001).  Heder was probably the first to use the genitive form “philosophy of…” in his writings to describe a form of philosophy that takes a specific subject matter (such as history or language) for closer analysis.  His Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity) in 1774 laid the principles on which modern anthropology is established.  By using the genitive form “philosophy of…,” it became possible for philosophers such as Herder to look at a specific subject matter, interpret and analyze it in order to develop new approaches and new methods for it.  In the Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772) Herder (2002) laid the foundations for philology (the study of ancient languages) which was later developed into modern linguistics by Humboldt (1971) in 1836.  Following this same spirit of analyzing the history and philosophy of a specific subject matter, this essay proposes a new philosophy of IT, one that is not necessarily tied to traditional engineering notions of IT as a tool.

It is important at this point to distinguish between “information technology” (IT) and “information systems” (IS).  This issue, as Checkland and Holwell (1998a) emphasize, is “crucial but confused.”  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail their definitions, but IT is assumed to be the product (the artifact) created by human activity whereas IS is the field that studies phenomena surrounding IT.  A more extensive discussion on this issue may be found in Hassan (2006).  One major difference that distinguishes the IS field from other fields of study is its focus on IT.  As a field, IS would not have emerged to its present state if not for IT.  As many authors have suggested, the general purpose computer is different from previous calculators and industrial machines (Bell, 1973; Higgins & Glickauf, 1954).  The computer is not just a special-purpose accounting machine that is used as a tool.  Instead this machine is a general purpose electronic device capable of an unlimited variety of applications and operations, providing infinite possibilities for discourse (Hassan & Will, 2006).

Before discussing the possibility for a philosophy of information technology, a brief introduction to the history and philosophy of technology, before the era of information technology, is necessary.  The philosophy of technology follows the tradition set by early philosophers of science such as Aristotle (Losee, 1972) and later philosophers such as Augusta Comte (1798-1857) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).  In the same way that the philosophy of science answers all philosophical questions arising from reflection on science, the philosophy of technology answers all philosophical questions arising from the reflection on technology.  The philosophy of technology, however, arrived later than the philosophy of science.  The earliest document to philosophize about technology in its current sense was probably Ernst Kapp’s Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877) (Fundamentals of a Philosophy of Technical Science) (Mitcham, 1994).  Kapp wrote Grundlinien to address the societal problems arising from the use of machines when he was farmer, carpenter, and stock raiser in Texas.  In it, Kapp views mechanical tools and machines, as well as language, science and the state, as projections of human organs or beings.

The intrinsic relationship that arises between tools and organs, and one that is to be revealed and emphasized—although it is more one of unconscious discovery than of conscious invention—is that in the tool the human continually produces itself. Since the organ whose utility and power is to be increased is the controlling factor, the appropriate form of a tool can be derived only from that organ (Quoted in Mitcham 1994, p. 23).

Even though Kapp wrote Grundlinien before the turn of the 20^th century, this view already contradicts the current engineering view of technology as mere tools.  IT may be an exceptional tool, but a tool nevertheless.  Traditionally, research in IS has always assumed the engineering view that technology is a tool (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).  Because IT is viewed as a mere tool, there is little need to theorize about it.  IT is therefore treated in IS research as a "black box" that is installed for the goals and objectives set by its designers—to compute, automate or improve a process.  Several efforts, especially in the 1980s, were undertaken to release the field of IS from this conception of IT (Kling, 1980; Kling & Scacchi, 1982), however, little progress was realized (R. Weber, 2003).  Unlike this predominant philosophy of IT in the IS field, Kapp’s philosophy of technology blurs the distinction between the human element, the environment and the artifact.  Because the artifact is an extension of the human organ, it should no longer be treated as a "black box."  Other philosophers such as McLuhan (1964) extend Kapp’s views and propose that not only is the modern medium the message (i.e., societies are shaped by the nature of the technological media), but that the medium is the massage that works as environments for societies.  Not unlike its human creators, every time a new technology is installed, a new environment is created and as noted by Kapp, enables the human to "continually produce itself."  The next sections explore similar insightful interpretations that can be used to chart a direction for the field of IS based on the philosophy of technology.

4. TIME FOR INFORMATION SYSTEM TO ESCAPE ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRAITJACKET

Before availing the IS field to different philosophical approaches, this section argues that the IS field should strip away the baggage it carries from its referent disciplines, specifically, organization and management science.  The IS field has historically limited itself to the design, use and implementation of IT in organizations.  Markus (1999) was the first to highlight the tendency of the field to be constrained by its roots in organizational science.  The IS field, she warns, is at a crossroads and in order to avoid possible extinction, needs to go beyond its traditional areas of study by revisiting its mission and its customers.  Markus notes that the core concerns of the IS field are no longer limited to the needs of the IS department and the organization that it serves.

Although traditionally, both organizational studies (OS) and IS research have been performed hand-in-hand, epistemologically, they are different (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001).  This close relationship between IS and OS is no surprise because many IS authors come from an OS background.  However, as the IS field enters the new millennium, the difference in the epistemology of these two areas of research are becoming more pronounced as the impact of IT become more publicly visible.  For instance, the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action at the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Geneva in 2003, asserts that the benefits of IT are global and are no longer limited to organizational concerns.  Conversely, the repercussions of the failures of IS are equally far-reaching.  For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Intelligence Community within the U.S. government blame, among other reasons, their ineffective IS for not being able to avert the tragedy of September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004).  The repercussions of this failure reverberated beyond the intelligence community.  Any inquiry into the role of IT in similar circumstances cannot be limited to the impact of IT within the organization.

The IS field has always been constrained by this organizational straitjacket since its inception.  Dickson (1981, p. 20) acknowledges that “much of the MIS research that has been performed has been done in an organizational setting.”  Not only is the field of IS epistemologically different from OS, it is ontologically different from OS.  The arguments presented by Orlikowski and Barley (2001) to support the epistemological difference between IS and OS research also support ontological differences between the two fields.  In their opinion, the agenda of much IS research closely resembles the agenda of architecture and other design sciences rather than of OS because IS studies the development of systems, its consequences, and provide practical solutions to real-life problems.  OS, however, is closer to traditional science because it provides parsimonious explanations to broad classes of organizational phenomena, and therefore discovers generalities, sets down general principles and identifies causal relationships.  Therefore, the subject matter (ontology) studied in IS is very different from the subject matter studied in OS.  For instance, in the limited context of the organization, OS may study "the best way" of managing people in order to improve productivity, whereas IS seeks to understand how technology can be designed and implemented to improve productivity.  Productivity however, is not limited to the organization.  The field of IS should also be studying how societies and even countries can be made more productive with the help of technology.  A field that is ontologically and epistemologically different from another cannot hope to flourish if it remains within the constraints of the latter.  Both the epistemological and ontological differences between IS and OS support the need for a fresh look at the philosophy of IT and henceforth the foundations of the IS field.

5. OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Organizational theory will continue to be useful to the IS field, however, IS needs to look elsewhere to establish a philosophical basis for disciplinary activity in the light of rapid changes overtaking the field.  The philosophy of technology provides such a basis.  Before elaborating on this philosophy, the term “technology” needs to be clearly defined.  Following Ihde (1993), this paper defines technology as something (1) invented, used, designed, or modified by man, (2) that has a concrete component or a material element, and (3) that must be implemented in practice (praxical).  This definition summarizes the distinction the Greeks made between physis and poiêsis (Feenberg, 1991; Introna, 2002).  Physis is what occurs in nature and is understood by the Greeks as that which creates itself.  Poiêsis is the practical activity done in which human beings engage when they produce something.  The result of poiêsis is often called an artifact and includes the products of art, craft, and social convention.  Automobiles and computers are therefore technologies.  But so is writing because it is also invented, it uses artifacts (pen and letters which are both material components) for the purpose of writing, and it is practically implemented, not an academic exercise.

A sports technique designed to improve an athlete’s performance or procedures used to reduce inventory are not technologies because there is no concrete component.  However, if the sports technique is taped, broken down frame by frame to analyze the most efficient form of motion, then, a technology has been employed to perfect a technique.  Similarly, if the procedure to reduce inventory holding costs is deployed in an enterprise resource planning system, the procedure (a technique) is technologically implicated, although by itself it is not a technology.  Certain interpersonal techniques do not employ technologies—styles of speech, modes of courtship, observation—but become intertwined with technologies if mediated by some IT system.  The distinction between technique and technology is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Difference between Technique and Technology

This distinction between technique and technology is critical because IS authors often claim that information systems does not necessarily require computers (Davis & Olson, 1985; G. Dickson, 1968).  This notion, perhaps valid during the time when the field of IS was still closely associated with the accounting field in the 1950s and 1960s, carries the implication that technology does not play a central role in IS research.  According to this notion of IS, manual office procedures (techniques) implemented using manual filing systems (a technology) qualify as information systems.  However, this definition of IS implicitly views computers (technology) as nothing more than an automated filing cabinet deployed to improve the same manual office procedures.  Focus is then placed on the techniques rather than on the infinite possibilities offered by such a general purpose electronic technology.  Focusing on the techniques discounts the possibility of philosophizing the role of the technology as part of human activity.

Unlike the modern conception of technology, the Greek’s understanding of technology as techné (the term that defines the principles involved in producing an object or bringing about an end; technology in the broadest sense) reflects the close relationship technology has with human activity.  In Greek tradition, both the existence and the essence of an artifact are created at the same time as it emerges.  Each technê contains the essence of the artifact to be made before it is made and is conceived as a response to necessity rather than an independent activity with an ultimate goal (Feenberg, 1991).  The common modern conception of technology assumes that the means (the technology) and the ends (the problem to be solved) are independent, and that technology is a neutral instrument, a pure means, based on universal knowledge serving natural needs (hence, the saying “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people”).  The Greeks instead see human activity as embodied in technology.  As Markus (1999) notes, this narrow “instrumentalist” (technology as instruments or tools) approach has caused the field of IS to ignore many important changes overtaking it and has caused the field to fall behind the ever increasing pace of technological change.  Very few studies give careful consideration to the philosophy of IT beyond this modern instrumental sense (Introna, 2002).

Two Traditional Notions of Technology

The Instrumental Theory—Science Creates Neutral Technologies

The instrumental view of technology is part of the traditional philosophy of technology.  The traditional positivistic view of science and technology posits that because the goal of science is the establishment of a value-free objective truth, problems with technology happen only at the applied level.  This view assumes that the problems of technology are simply problems of the application of science, not of science per se.  This neutral nature of technology suggests that social and environmental impacts of technology are accidental side effects of progress (Feenberg, 1991; Ihde, 1993).  In relation to IS research such a view espouses the study of the actions, the decision making, impacts, and cost-benefit measures of the application of the technology rather than a study of the actual technology.

This instrumental view of technology accepts technology as neutral tools, standing ready to serve the purpose of their users.  To the field of IS, this view implies that the technology itself is indifferent to the variety of ends it can be employed to achieve.  Technology is indifferent to politics and social issues, to the objectives of its users, and its transfer is only limited by costs.  It also implies that research relating to technology need only to be rationally verifiable; thus, what works in one organization or society can be expected to work in another.  The limitations of this view are clear, especially when applied within an organizational framework.  Technology such as IT will be treated somewhat like calculators, as transparent means to the goals of the organization.  Research stemming from this approach will tend to focus on the concerns of other disciplines that specialize in social and organizational issues, instead of the new relationships arising from use of IT.  Consequently, IS research guided by this view will work to validate or strengthen organization science or management theories instead of building those that the IS field can claim as their own.

The Phenomenological and Substantive Theory—Technology is not Neutral

The second traditional view of technology comes from the interpretive phenomenological tradition of Husserl (1859-1938) and Heidegger (1977b).  Heidegger asserts that ends cannot be separated from means because technology affects the metaphysical aspect of things by becoming a specific mode of “revealing” (e.g. a hydroelectric dam changes the essence of a river from a producer of water to become a produce of power).  Humans as inventors of technology are not outside the technology; instead, human actors are part of the technology.  Heidegger views that technology, with its magnifying and transforming power, treats the entire world, man included, as "standing reserves," and impose its nihilistic will on man.  Consequently technology "enframes" how humans view themselves, and creates a new sense of "being" that makes humans capable of dehumanizing other humans towards their own personal goals.  This rather deterministic view of technology is later picked up by Ellul and Marcuse.

Following Heidegger, Jacques Ellul (1973) and Herbert Marcuse (1964) offer their substantive philosophy of technology.  Both philosophers of technology bring a more pessimistic view of technology constituting a cultural system capable of restructuring the entire world as an object of control.  Therefore, using any technology means conforming to it instead of the other way around.  The problem is not that technology has taken over people lives, but that in choosing to use them people make the unwitting choices that shape their culture and ideology.  Political powers, with the help of authoritarian and autonomous technologies, are able to subordinate populations without coercion.  Not only is application of technology a kind of domination, technology itself is domination of nature and man.  Technology therefore is not simply a means or a tool, “specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology ‘subsequently’ and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus…such a ‘purpose’ of domination is substantive” (Habermas (1971) quoting Marcuse).  This substantive view of technology carries research on technology to the other extreme and explains the deterministic and dystopian view that formed much of the justification for the Luddite protest of the early 1800s.

Critical and Phenomenological Notions of Technology

In contrast to the utopian and dystopian views of technology, several philosophers have attempted to develop a more negotiated and realistic view.  They are categorized into critical and phenomenological views of technology.

Jurgen Habermas’s Critical View

Based on the theory of communicative action, Habermas (1988) finds a middle ground between the utopian and dystopian views.  This alternative approach views the interpretation of social facts as a subjective activity in which “only the meaning intended by the acting subject provides adequate access to behavior performed in a situation that he himself has interpreted” (p. 54).  He argues that although technological knowledge implies power, such information is only significant if utilized by the results of technical progress.  Habermas (1971) views that technical development is not autonomous; instead, he views that technology is socially and politically contingent.  Thus Habermas disputes Marxian and Marcusian views that technology takes a life of its own in opposition to the interests of its producers.  However, he still agrees that technology becomes a universal form of material production, circumscribes an entire culture and projects a historical totality.  In other words, technology has ensured its own cumulative progress, has subordinated traditional structures of legitimization and has created a world of domination under the guise of modernization.  The issue to Habermas is therefore “how can the power of technical control [technology] be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?” (p. 57).

The Critical Theory of Michael Feenberg

Feenberg’s (1991) critical theory accepts portions of the instrumental view and the substantive view.  He accepts the instrumental view that human action is paramount and that civilization is not decided by “the immanent drift of technology” (p. 14).  He also accepts the substantive view that technology is non-neutral, but rejects the fatalism of Ellul and Marcuse.  Feenberg agrees with Habermas and seeks to explain how technology can be redesigned to the needs of a democratic society.  The difference between Feenberg and Habermas is that Feenberg treats technology as a “social battlefield,” or “a parliament of things” on which alternatives can be debated and chosen.  Because technology is inherently non-neutral, the notion of use of technology is irrelevant because the choice itself has already created a new life-world.  So, according to Feenberg any change must be made in the technological sphere itself before it is deployed.  For example, one side argues that the computer will eliminate routine tasks and improve our way of life, while the other argues that it puts millions out of work.  Critical theory says that technology is neither good nor bad, but can evolve into very different technologies within the framework of domination or democratization.  In other words, if more technologies of surveillance and hierarchical control are invented, it is likely that the life-world will be one of domination.  Alternatively, if more communicative or “informating” (Zuboff, 1988) technologies are deployed, it is likely a more democratic life-world will evolve.

The of Phenomenology of Bachelard, Latour and Foucault—Technology as Technoscience

Drawing from Heidegger’s phenomenology and Dewey’s “knowing as a technological artifact” view (Hickman, 1990) several philosophers view technology not only as paramount over science, but as a prerequisite for the progress of science.  Bachelard (1984, p. 13) first described this kind of inquiry as "phenomeno-technology," a form of phenomenology that is a combination of rationalism and realism.  This philosophy rejects the traditional view that science is the basis of technology.   To explain this concept, Latour (1987, p. 174) coined the term “technoscience” to describe the kind of science that depends on its technological instruments.   This “technoscience” view of technology inverts the relationship between science and technology.  Foucault (1970; 1977) also supports this view and assigns not only power to technology but also attributes the evolution and progress of knowledge to technology.  For example, Foucault (1970) credits the microscope for making possible the field of biology because the relationship between organs and their functions that forms the foundation of biology could never have been uncovered without the help of the microscope.  The same goes for physics with its instruments and apparatus, or genetics and molecular biology with their electron microscopes.  Essentially, according to this view, technology is the origin and cause of science (Ihde, 1979).

The significance of this view to the IS field is that it contradicts the conventional view of IS as an applied field.  Accepting IS as an applied field implies that basic research will never be its major activity.  It also implies that if there is any theory to be tested, it will most likely be one drawn from its many “referent disciplines” instead of one discovered within the field itself.  Viewing IS as a technoscience reverses such limitations because it opens the field to the possibility of autochthonous and original theories.  It also releases the field of IS from its dependence on its references disciplines and puts the field at the same standing as physics, biology and other technosciences that have traditionally developed its theories from its work in highly technological and instrument-filled laboratories (Latour, 1987).

Don Ihde’s Phenomenology of Instrumentation and the Life-World

Following up on the concept of the technoscience, Ihde (1979; 1990) develops an additional dimension to that conception of technology.  A detailed explanation of this approach in the IS field is available in Rathswohl (1991).  Essentially, this approach entails not an impact, but an experience of technology, a form of man-machine phenomenology based on Heidegger’s (1977a) philosophy of “things-at-hand.”  Traditional notions of science and technology accept technology as the effect of applying science, which implies that the solution lies in either the human application or in the conceptual foundation of science itself.  By accepting the aforementioned concept of “technoscience”, Ihde (1979) is able to argue that the mind (as in science) rise from the body (as in technology).  This body-technology relationship takes the shape of praxis and an interpretation of technology as a theory of action.  It is from embodying praxis that the body-technology becomes concrete.  Research in technology can then proceed by examining the human experiences from the embodiment of technology or the immersion of humans in technology.  In the same way that a person experiences a blackboard through a chalk, a user experiences his world through technology such as IT.  Using this approach notions such as the level of transparency of the technology, transformation of the users experience, amplification of experience and knowledge, distance between the user and reality and hermeneutic relations between humans and the real-world can be studied by the IS field.  All of these conceptions provide guidelines for new approaches for studying the technology of IT in the IS field.  All these conceptions of technology are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Views of Technology

6. THE PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION IN THE IS FIELD

Thus far, the paper has unveiled several useful philosophical approaches for studying technology in the IS field.  However, little has been said so far about the information in IT, which is what the technology creates, uses and manages.  As the ongoing computer and information revolution enters the 21st century, the landscape of the philosophy of information has reverted to becoming philosophically "virgin territory" (Floridi, 2003).  New conceptual problems, unprecedented issues, novel theories and ideas are increasingly demanding new approaches and philosophies of information.  As Floridi (2003, p. 461) notes:

The information revolution has been changing the world profoundly, irreversibly and problematically for some time now, at a breathtaking pace and with an unprecedented scope. It has thus created entirely new realities, made possible unprecedented phenomena and experiences, provided a wealth of extremely powerful tools and methodologies, and raised a wide range of unique problems and conceptual issues. All this calls for conceptual analysis and exploration, and hence for the development of PI [philosophy and information].

Floridi (2002) proposes a definition for the philosophy of information that encompasses both its metaphysics and its applications.  His approach is not to specify one particular view of information, but to view its philosophy to be a "unified and cohesive theoretical framework that allows for further specialization" (p. 139).  And because information is such a broad and dynamic concept, its philosophy can be expected to change with the times.  Floridi's (2002) view is a philosophy of information rooted within the field of computer science, which can be traced back to the philosophy of computation and symbolism made famous by Herbert Simon, Turing and the early artificial intelligence movement.  Such a view may be suitable for computer science and its goals of perfecting computational technology (Floridi, 2004), but is short of the goals of other fields such as IS.  Floridi (2003) realizes this shortcoming and proposes a novel metaphysical philosophy viewing information as "demiurgic" (a creational power) making "possible the construction, conceptualization, semanticization and finally the moral stewardship of reality, both natural and artificial" (p. 465).  It is this philosophy that will be expanded in the next section.  Within the field of IS itself, Drucker once commented to Markus (1999, p. 200-201), “The problem with your field, is that you haven’t figured out that it’s about information, not about technology.”  The core concerns of IS goes beyond technology and involves subjective humanistic concerns.  Despite the need to lay a solid foundation for the philosophy of information in IS, few efforts have met with any success.  Many previous attempts to theorize information fell short of expectations (Checkland & Holwell, 1998b).  A notable exception is Mingers's (1995; 1996) efforts in formulating a philosophy and defining a theory for information in IS.  A search of the Web of Science did not give any relevant results for "philosophy of information" in IS and only two relevant references using the keywords “information theory” and “information systems.”  The reason why the philosophy of information has not shown any progress in the IS field is in part due to the general acceptance of Shannon's (1948) analytical and mathematical philosophy of information.

Like many other fields such as psychology, physiology, optics, physics, linguistics, biology, sociology, statistics, and journalism (Klein, 1990), the field of IS has adopted the views of Hartley (1928) and Shannon (1948) for its philosophy of information (Culnan, 1986; Davis & Olson, 1985).  This analytical and mathematical philosophy of information does not support the theoretical constructs necessary for the kind of information studied in IS (Checkland & Holwell, 1998b).  It assumes a metaphysical philosophy suited for computer science, viewing information merely as symbols devoid of meaning.  Mathematical information theory provides a way of measuring the efficient communication or reproduction of symbols, not information content (Kramer-Friedrich, 1986).  As Shannon himself admits, the “semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon, 1948, p. 379).  This view of information separates the disciplinary subject matter of IS from the subject matter of computer science.  Information as studied by IS has meaning and therefore causes activity in a receiving system simply by virtue of its form (Strombach, 1986).  Although calls have been made to study information in IS using its framework of meaning (Stamper, 1991), there has been little progress.

Mingers (1995; 1996) finds that the most relevant philosophy of information for the field of IS is Dretske’s (1982) view of information.  This philosophy of information views information not merely as symbols, but as signs that carry meaning.  This philosophy supports theoretical constructs necessary for handling information as studied in the field of IS.  Unlike the analytical and mathematical philosophy of information, it focuses on the semantic content of information, not about the container or the symbols used in the communication.  This philosophy distinguishes information based on its meaning and its semiotic nature.  This approach separates the amount of information from its meaning, and relates the information to its truth value.  It is the receipt of that information in the individual that generates meaning, not the amount of information transmitted.  For example, a knock on a door is transmitted, even when no one is listening to it.  But the meaning that it carries is only realized when it is received.  Humans often select the information that it wants to receive.  So for Dretske, although information is objective, the meaning that it engenders is subjective.

To illustrate how the amount of information can be separated from its meaning, and how the relationship between the sender and the receiver can be used to measure the content that the information carries, the following example is provided.  When a friend visits and uses a patterned knock on the door to announce his or her arrival, the special “friend knock” is information that contains a special meaning.  The sound of the knock, which may be heard by the neighbors, is information that does not provide any special significance.  The pattern of the knock indicates his/her friend has arrived at the door.  Philosophers refer to the former as extentional, and the latter, intensional because of the dependency between the information and the receiver of that information (the receiver needs to recognize the special knock).  Dretske’s view clarifies what needs to occur for a belief to be constituted as knowledge.  In this case, the person’s belief that his/her friend has arrived becomes knowledge because of the meaning extracted from the information (the patterned knock) by the receiver, not the information (the sound of the knock) per se.  This is how the amount of information can be separated from its meaning.  Consequently, it is possible for the signal to carry more than one kind of content or meaning.

This brief illustration demonstrates how such a philosophy of information describes the peculiar intensional structure of the user’s cognitive states using the manifestation of its underlying information-theoretic character.  The source of the intensionality inherent in the transmission of that information can be set by building a relationship between the source and the properties of the signal.  Information of this form will have the capacity to yield knowledge and judgment, the ingredients to discovering truth-value in any given circumstance.  The potential and format for this schema of transmission of real information content, not mere symbols as in mathematical information theory, can become a source of long-term fecundity for the IS field.

This capability of information to have meaning distinct from its semantics opens the door to a wider interpretation of information.  As an example of this broader interpretation of information, Borgmann (1999) proposes three kinds of information, (1) information about reality, (2) information for reality and (3) information as reality, all of which may be extracted from the same extensional structure.  Borgmann's (1999) view is consistent with Floridi's (2003) philosophy that information is demiurgic , information that could represent or construct reality.  The recording and reporting activities performed in IS practice manipulate information about reality.  Information developed and communicated in system design and in decision making, is information for reality.  Music reproduction is an example of information as reality.  Within these three approaches to understanding information, many aspects that are not being currently addressed by the IS field can be uncovered.  For example, using the approach to information about reality IS scholars can theorize different kinds of contexts and categories of information that closely describe such reality.  The debacle surrounding the misinformation concerning weapons of mass destruction that Iraq allegedly had is an example of information about reality gone awry.  Although it was possible to assess the truth value of this information, based on the credibility of its sources and the coherency of its format, very few people did so.  Could the right type of IS have alerted the US intelligence community of the validity of the information it contains? The result of this inability to relate information to its truth-value has damaged the reputation of the US intelligence community as well as the reputation of a famous US daily newspaper (New York Times, 2004).

An instance of the use of information for reality is the use of information in agreements to organize people.  Based on this view of information, IS scholars can theorize about the role of information in institutional and societal development.  Another example of information for reality is the use of information in the design sciences (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004).  In October 1996 at the ACM Conference on Object-Oriented Programs, Systems, Languages and Applications (OOPSLA), Christopher Alexander, the famed architect that founded the theory of design patterns was called to give a keynote speech in honor of his work and contribution to computer science and software patterns (Alexander, 1999).  Alexander envisioned the critical role that software, because of its ubiquity, could play in fixing the two billion buildings in the world to make them more “whole” and friendly to human life.  This challenge of bridging the world of computer science and the world of art and architecture was left unanswered by the computer science field because as a discipline, it is ill-equipped to address such design sciences.  Only a field like IS, that recognizes the meaning in this information, is capable of bridging this gap.  Drawings, charts and guides used in architecture are instances of information for reality or praxis.  Systems that are able to provide and enhance such information will be of immense value to society.

The third view of meaningful information is information as reality.  Borgmann’s (1999) example for this kind of information is music reproduced on CDs.  Anyone is able to reproduce reality by playing a music score. The higher the resolution of the message, the lesser is the demand on the intelligence of the listener.  Within the context of business functions, the potential for research in information that represent reality such as virtual reality, simulation, and immersive technologies is virtually untouched.  Similarly, research on Internet activities, distance learning, telework and online gaming provide vast areas of productive research for IS scholars.  The combination of these views of information can be studied in any particular IT-related context.  For example, the power of democratized knowledge used by Internet bloggers to cause Trent Lott, the majority Senate Leader, to resign (Krugman, 2002), should be of interest to IS scholars wanting to discover regimes of power that can be manipulated in public life using merely information about, for and representing reality.

7. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY + PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION=PHILOSOPHY OF IT

Following Floridi (2002), the synthesis of the various philosophies of technology and Dretske’s philosophy of information result in a philosophy of IT that provide a "unified and cohesive theoretical framework that allows for further specialization" (p. 139).  This philosophy of IT embraces previous research in IS, and at the same time opens up the boundaries of the field to novel and unique objects and concepts of study for the field.  It recognizes a core that can be accepted by most IS scholars without diluting the specificity and uniqueness of the field—the core of technological information.  Table 3 shows the theoretical framework conceptualized from the synthesis of the various philosophies of technology with Borgmann’s (1999) views of information.  Each cell in the table provides a unique conception or theory of IT.  Each conception of IT is made possible by the subjective meaning engendered by the technological information that is contained in the technology (Dretske, 1982).

To validate the efficacy of these conceptions, each of these eighteen conceptions of IT can be contrasted against Orlikowski and Iacono’s (2001) interpretations of IT.  Their “IT as Tool,” “IT as Computation” and “IT as absent” views are equivalent to the instrumental view of IT (first row in Table 3.  IT makes possible labor substitution, labor augmentation, general increase in productivity and information processing, and changes in social relations (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001) because it is through IT that computational work and information processing is performed ([3]--as containers for reality), collaboration and modeling is made possible ([1] IT as neutral tools that describe reality), and social relations and communication behaviors are redesigned ([2] IT as neutral tools to support the design of reality).  The key point of the instrumental view is that IT is a neutral enabler that is independent of the goals of its users.  Ultimately, the users have full control over IT’s enabling capabilities.

Table 3: Interpretations of IT

Orlikowski and Iacono’s (2001) three “proxy” views of IT focus on the subjective interpretations of IT by individuals.  Falling in this category is the proxy view of “IT as perception” which includes studies that measure the qualities of IT such as its effectiveness, ease-of-use, and intention-to-use.  This view does not escape the instrumentalist interpretation because such studies measure the results of the use of IT as a tool and assumes that substandard performance can be improved by fixing it.  The same is the case with the proxy view of “IT as capital.”  This view treats IT as an economic resource in the same way as other tools in the organization are treated.  The proxy view of “IT as diffusion” overlaps the instrumental view of IT with other non-instrumental views because it involves the integration and penetration of IT in the social context.  Although this is partly an issue of use and intention-to-use, it is at the same time also an issue of how IT is capable of dominating the environment (i.e. the substantive view that [5] IT dominates reality).

Orlikowski and Iacono’s (2001) “ensemble” view of IT overlaps considerably with the substantive view, social action view, critical theory, technoscience view and life-world view (i.e. interpretations of IT from [4] through [18]).  The ensemble view focuses on the socio-technical and “web-of-computing” views that do not separate the IT from its context and its related resources.  The ensemble view is also the least studied view of IT in the Information Systems Research (ISR) journal (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).  The proposed philosophy of IT expands considerably on the ensemble view by offering fifteen different theories consistent with it.  It is beyond the scope of this study to describe in detail all eighteen theories of IT, however, two of these theories will be expanded on in later sections.  Before describing in detail the two selected theories, it is important to understand why the IS field needs to go beyond its current restrictive instrumental view of IT.

Implications of Remaining with the Instrumental Approach to Technology

As Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) note, the nominal, tool, proxy and computational views produce the largest number of studies in the ISR journal.  All of these views follow the instrumental philosophy of technology.  One major implication of the IS field remaining with the instrumental view of IT is to continue limiting much of its research to organizationally-related impact studies.  Consequently, as argued in previous sections, IS research remains bounded by its “organizational straitjacket.”  Remaining with the instrumental approach also implies that the field will neglect substantive impacts of IT.  Research in IS will be limited to following technical rules for the purpose of the maximization the efficiency of computer resources in social systems and enhancing the power of technical control.  As a result, the field will continue to be subjugated to a multitude of environmental and technological forces, be they organizational bureaucracy or advances in technological development.  Although changes in technology is always a welcome justification for research, remaining with the instrumental view will cause the field to become an impoverished account of reality, always six months behind in reporting on the latest whiz-bang IT gadget, when it should be a force that shapes reality.  It is not surprising that the field is currently questioning its own legitimacy (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003); or in Marcusian terms, slowly becoming “one-dimensional.”  The next two subsections expand on two interpretations of IT—[7] IT as communicative action to illuminate reality, and [11] design of IT to emancipate or dominate reality.

[7] Social Action Theory View of IT as Communicative Action to Illuminate Reality

The view of IT as communicative action to illuminate reality has the potential to uncover concepts emerging in the field of IS that are either not addressed by IS research but are critical, or are addressed in the past but not well researched.  For example, the concept of failure in IS can be studied based on several levels of Habermas’ reformulation of Weberian “rationalization” (M. Weber, 1947).  This approach introduces a pre-conceptual schema that distinguishes between work and interaction.

Work or purposive-rational action is always governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge.  These rules help stakeholders predict what will happen in an IS.  Purposive-rational action can be categorized into two levels, instrumental action and strategic action.  Instrumental action is similar to Gorry and Scott-Morton’s (1971) “structured decision making” concept in which the work is accomplished based on an effective control of reality.  Strategic action is similar to “unstructured decision making” in the sense that its alternative choices are less controlled, and depend on variables from a universe of values and maxims instead of controlled realities.

Interaction or communication action is the process of interacting based on consensual norms which defines expectations about behavior which must be understood and recognized by the stakeholders.  These norms are enforced through sanctions and rules.  Lyytinen and Klein (1985) introduced this same scheme to the IS field in an IFIP Conference as alternative theory for IS research against the prevailing engineering paradigm of systems development.  However, their implications were limited to the context of systems development and fell short of defining researchable concepts for IS.

Within this schema failure can be caused by incompetence, which is a violation of instrumental or strategic rules, in the development of the system or in its deployment.  Failure can also be caused by deviant behavior, which is a violation of rules of interaction and social norms, not the rules of work.  Solutions to the former may include supplying the person with skills, which is a construct that addresses both work and interaction.  A summary of the schema and possible objects and concepts that can be studied by the field is reproduced in Table 4.

Hence, failure can be defined in the context of irrationality, which is a deviation from certain ideals, be they technical or interactive.  So, a system that have been successfully developed according to the criteria provided by the organization, may fail, not because the consultant was incompetent, or the requirements were not fulfilled, but because certain ideals and benchmarks that are later uncovered during its deployment, are not met.  This is an example of how the schema is capable of deconstructing the kind of subjective behavioral constructs in IS first highlighted by Lucas (1975).

Table 4: Schema of Communicative Action

[11] Feenberg’s Critical Theory: Design of IT to Emancipate or Dominate Reality

Feenberg’s Critical Theory releases IS professionals from the tedium of engineering-based systems analysis and design to the more emancipative nature of IT development.  Instead of merely automating tasks, the nature of this design of IT seeks to enhance human communication and information exchange.  Examples of such designs can be found in collaborative communities such as MySpace.com and the Creative Commons (creativecommons.com).  One major implication of Feenberg’s Critical Theory is to make less irrelevant primary measures deployed in IS such as “IS use” and effectiveness of IS from increase in use.  Because IT is considered non-neutral and becomes part of the life-world of the user, any change in the level of use can no longer be considered a measure of its effectiveness.  For example, no amount of increase in use of computers in a dysfunctional work group will change the nature of the work group.  The workgroup becomes more dysfunctional as the IT use increases.  However, IT designed to reduce conflict and enhance collaboration transforms the workgroup’s reality.  Current IS research, such as research in fit and organizational alignment (Bergeron, Raymond, & Rivard, 2004), are just beginning to explicate such a relationship.  If there is an immanent connection between IT and the structure of purposive-rational action, it is possible to reconstruct the history of IT from the point of view of the step-by-step objectivation of the elements of the system.

8. CONCLUSION

The panelists of senior IS authors at ICIS 2005 (“IS Research that Really Matters: Beyond the IS Rigor - Relevance Debate”) acknowledge that IT has had a profound impact on human endeavor, both positive (e.g., find survivors of the Tsunami) and negative (e.g., plan the 9/11 terrorist attacks).  Yet they also acknowledge that IS research has lagged behind such issues.  One of the panelists feel that it is not necessary for the IS field to directly solve societal problems.  Instead, the responsibility of IS researchers is to inform those responsible for organizing solutions—business managers—to address these societal problems.  Other panelists propose a less parochial approach and feel that the field should transform to address these broader societal issues directly.  Regardless of the approach which IS research should adhere to, the content of IS research needs to include any and all phenomena that is IT-related.  If IT is capable of solving societal problems, IS research should not ignore them just because they are outside organizational concerns.  And this paper has charted a philosophy of IT capable of supporting such endeavors.  These approaches emancipate the field from its baggage of and from its dependencies to its reference disciplines.  It builds a new set of possibilities for research in IS.  These approaches also develop a unique identity for IS, a distinctive domain that no other discipline has laid and will probably not be able to lay claim to.  These approaches to IT frees IS research from being limited to "organizational" approaches that are limited to organizational boundaries.  It becomes possible, in this way, for the field of IS to lay a foundation towards IS research in societal and global contexts, to get involved in fulfilling global needs such as the goals of the Information Society, an area of activity that is seldom discussed by IS scholars.  The first world summit of the Information Society held in Geneva (International Telecommunication Union, 2003) proclaimed their commitment:

…to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life....Our challenge is to harness the potential of information and communication technology to promote the development goals of the Millennium Declaration, namely the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary education; promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women; … for development for the attainment of a more peaceful, just and prosperous world.

No other field of study has the necessary interdisciplinary content capable of informing the business community and society on how IT can help accomplish this goal.  However, the IS field cannot accomplish this task if it remains under the shadow of its reference disciplines.  The foundations of its core concerns--technology and information--has to be built upon concepts and theories capable of addressing all aspects of this interdisciplinary effort, concepts and theories that go beyond the organizational and management sciences.

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